Chapter 1231: Chapter 913: Pig Teammate_3 Chapter 1231: Chapter 913: Pig Teammate_3 But the problem was that at that ti, relations between Britain and Russia were not good; what seed to be a letter reminding the Russians instead made Stalin himself believe it was the British trying to sow discord between Germany and Russia.
Why did Stalin think so? Because long before the outbreak of World War II, the British and French had repeatedly tried to sow discord regarding German-Russian relations and even attempted to divert German attention toward Eastern Europe, initiating a conflict between Germany and Russia.
But at that ti, Germany was not foolish; most of the Germans’ hatred was directed at the French, and to rashly start a war with Russia would have been trouble seeking trouble.
Moreover, Russia, constantly ostracized by Europe, also thought of keeping a low profile, so the provocations from Britain and France had no effect and only made their relations with Russia even tenser.
Unexpectedly, it was because of the poor relations between Britain, France, and Russia that the British’s well-intentioned reminder was not taken seriously by the Russians, and instead, it made the Russians feel the British were harboring ill intentions.
In a eting inside the Russian governnt, Stalin also ntioned the letter from the British Pri Minister and confidently stated that the movent of the German military was rely for strategic defense against Russia, a sign of fear of the Russians, and definitely not as the British had described it—as an attack on Russia.
Even more, Stalin referred to Winston Schmidt’s letter as a belated April Fool’s joke and claid that before a clear winner was determined on the Western Europe battlefield, the Germans definitely did not have the military capability to attack Russia.
This matter thus ca to nothing, because of Stalin’s indifference, no one inside Russia took the German military movents seriously, and the frontline troops had no preparations to respond.
On April 7, 1937, Schurenburg, the German Envoy in Russia, openly revealed to the Russian Envoy in Germany, Zekarnozov, then in Moscow, that Germany was about to attack Russia and even disclosed the specific date of the attack.
Convinced, Schurenburg thought it was not good news that Germany was attacking Russia and hoped Zekarnozov would report it to the Moscow governnt and initiate contact between the Russian and German governnts to avoid this unnecessary war.
Upon hearing this, Zekarnozov beca imdiately panic-stricken and rushed to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report the news after their eting ended.
That sa day, Stalin convened a political eting and inford everyone about Schurenburg’s warning.
But god-complex Stalin did not take Schurenburg’s warning seriously, instead continually emphasizing to all officers that it was rely Germany bluffing.
Stalin even swore confidently, “Germany hopes to create misleading information through their envoy to attract the attention of Britain and France, achieving a surprise attack on France.”
“We do not need to worry about a German attack; our borders will be as strong as steel, and mighty Russia will face no danger.”
On April 8, the Russian spy, Zorge, also reported to Russia that Germany might attack and included a copy of a telegram from the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, ntioned privately, about a planned mid-April attack on Russia.
But for blindly confident Stalin, he again dismissed this intelligence as German dostic misinformation and did not take it seriously.
On April 10, 1937, the German Army completed all their movents and was waiting for the last batch of military supplies to be transported to the front line.
On the evening of April 10, Winston Schmidt once again reminded Stalin that the German attack was real and advised the Russian military to prepare defenses at the borders.
Compared to his previous letter, Schmidt’s reminder this ti was more sincere, even genuinely wanting Russia to be prepared in advance and not suffer heavy casualties when facing the German attack.
After all, Britain wanted Germany and Russia to wear each other out; Britain certainly did not want Germany to quickly overwhelm Russia.
But unexpectedly for Schmidt, Stalin again dismissed Schmidt’s advice as British misinformation and scornfully destroyed the entire telegram.
On April 11th, Russia’s most famous dia, TASS, issued a statent: “The reports of a possible German attack on Russia appearing in newspapers from Britain and other countries are all misleading propaganda from these nations, tactics against Germany and Russia.
The Russian people believe that any talk of Germany planning to attack Russia is baseless, such rumors harm the trust and goodwill of all Russian citizens.”
Good, very good, exceptionally good.
That was Schmidt’s response after seeing the Russian dostic dia’s reply.
For blindly arrogant Russia and Stalin, Schmidt had utterly lost hope.
Since the Russians were so blindly arrogant, let Germany and Russia fight it out. After all, with a population in the hundreds of millions, the loss of a few million people was not a big deal for Russia.
As to whether Russia could be quickly defeated by Germany, Schmidt still had so trust in Russia.
Although the combat capability of the Russian military was an unknown, Russians’ desire for their territory ant that any nation wanting to take their land would have to face a sowhat frenzied Russia.
Especially now with its brand-new governnt, how the fight between Russia and Germany would turn out was really unknown.
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