After a long internal debate, Myron Case finally called off the argunts and announced his decision.
They would launch new products—not the custom chip just yet—but instead bring forward a few devices that were originally planned for the end of the year.
Among them was a consur-oriented large-screen entertainnt product called the KPAD, a tablet device that would mark a major expansion into a new category.
Initially, the plan was to continue polishing the KPAD's details, but given the situation, releasing it now was acceptable.
This product targeted users who felt that phone screens were too small and wanted sothing larger and more portable than a laptop. It was lightweight, convenient, and based on extensive market research—Myron had personally approved it.
Then ca the newest phone: the MK3.
Originally, the MK3 was scheduled for release next year.
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But if they released it this year, calling it "MK3" would make it seem rushed. So Myron decided to rena it to MK2 Pro—just a na change.
However, this ant adjusting all pre-prepared promotional materials and altering production lines that had already started manufacturing. That would cause so losses, but it was unavoidable.
As for the self-developed chip, Myron decided to delay its launch until next year, when it would be more stable.
Of course, that ant sacrificing the hairlines of all R&D staff as they worked overti to finalize the chip and ensure it was flawless.
With the decision made, Micfo quickly announced its own upcoming launch event—just after Facebook's.
It would be the first ti Micfo hosted a second product launch in the sa year.
Anyone could see this was a direct response to Facebook's smartphone launch.
Previously, Micfo had remained calm and indifferent to other competitors. But a partnership between Gastar Electronic Entertainnt and Facebook? That was different.
Anyone who dug a little would quickly discover the history between Myron and Gastar, and understand why Micfo was reacting so strongly.
After all, Myron had once been ousted from his own company because of Gastar. If he didn't take this seriously, he wouldn't be a worthy CEO.
Micfo announced four new products: a tablet (KPAD), the new MK2 Pro smartphone, a laptop, and an all-in-one PC.
Most of these were originally planned for year-end release, and developnt was nearly complete, so the schedule adjustnt wasn't too risky.
The tablet drew the most attention. It was a new experint for Micfo, and existing fans expressed strong interest in buying it.
anwhile, over on the Facebook and Gastar side, their launch strategy was much more thodical.
They had everything prepared in advance. Micfo's actions felt rushed and reactive, while Facebook and Gastar moved steadily and confidently.
Takayuki had actually intended to launch Facebook's smartphone earlier in the year.
But he was too busy at the ti—with multiple ga projects in the pipeline—so he couldn't coordinate with Facebook just yet.
This delay gave Facebook's R&D team extra ti to refine both the OS and the hardware.
After wrapping up launches for Monster Hunter, Bayonetta, and others, Takayuki finally had ti to work closely with Facebook.
From then on, the two companies jointly began an intense marketing campaign.
Gastar occasionally used the campaign to promote another upcoming title: Final Fantasy VII: Crisis Core.
This was one of their most anticipated projects.
Fans who still held unresolved feelings about Final Fantasy VII were eager for more content in that universe.
But Gastar held back the release to build hype—waiting for the perfect emotional mont to strike.
The release was scheduled for Black Friday, the biggest shopping season in the U.S., to maximize profits.
Facebook's smartphone, however, would launch in early August.
At launch, buyers of different versions of the phone would receive different ga bundles.
They would include classic retro titles—for free.
Things like Super Mario (FC), the original Legend of Zelda, and troid, among others.
These titles were all legendary hits of their ti.
Even today, many gars still loved them. They were staples in the speedrunning community.
Now, players could enjoy them on a smartphone—without needing to carry around a handheld console. That alone made it worth it.
So companies sensed opportunity and launched smartphone-compatible ga controllers even before Facebook's announcent.
These were cheap to manufacture but could bring in massive profits if they sold well—an easy win. So many unrelated companies rushed into the accessory market.
On launch day, Facebook sold over one million units of its smartphone.
For a brand-new device, that kind of debut was incredible. It showed just how powerful a well-matched partnership could be.
At the sa ti, demand for smartphones was growing.
Micfo's phones had been positioned as high-end products.
But general consurs also needed affordable smartphones.
Several companies had been planning to enter this space with low-cost, low-quality phones—hoping to make a quick buck.
Then Facebook showed up—and crushed them.
Facebook sold phones at nearly cost price, and combined it with aggressive marketing. Those other manufacturers had no chance.
So companies complained, accusing Facebook of undercutting and disrupting the market with ultra-low prices.
But there wasn't much they could do.
Facebook wasn't selling at a loss. They just priced the phones slightly above cost—and users appreciated it.
Consurs saw Facebook as a fair, consur-friendly company.
And beyond that, it was a top-tier gaming device.
Demand from gars alone exceeded a million units. With such montum, sales were only expected to keep growing.
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