Chapter 78: Declaration of War (1)
While Robespierre and Lafayette were trying to slow down France's march towards war, the influence of the Girondins and the moderate factions pushed France closer to conflict.
Interestingly, it wasn't the original moderate mbers who started to unite on this issue. The one who rallied the moderates was not even originally part of their faction; it was Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville, a mber of the Jacobin Club.
Brissot had started his career as a journalist and had followed the Duke of Orleans for a ti. After the Duke's diplomatic mission to England, he briefly aligned with Lafayette. However, after King Louis XVI's flight, he shifted his support toward the Republic and clashed directly with Lafayette in the Jacobin Club. During the split in the Jacobin Club, he sided with Robespierre.
In the new elections, he beca a representative of Paris in the National Assembly. It was there that he ford a friendship with soone who would be of great significance later
Georges Danton.
The National Assembly was an unusual place where the more radical a representative was, the more attention they received, and the more "influential" they beca. This environnt led Brissot to radicalize his political views in two main aspects.
The first was his endorsent of the Republic. In the National Assembly, most of the moderates had lost their trust in the king, making it easy to applaud any attack on him. Brissot introduced the "Emigre Act," which targeted the nobles who had fled the country. He accused these nobles of plotting to kidnap the king, conspiring to incite rebellion, and declared them enemies of France. He proposed asures like ordering their return for trial (though it was highly unlikely they would return). If they didn't return, they could be tried in absentia, convicted, and face various penalties against their persons (which couldn't be enforced) and their property (which could).
Brissot made people believe that the "Emigre Act" would significantly alleviate or even resolve the crisis caused by the excessive issuance of assignats.
Assignats, initially backed by church property, would have been fine if the governnt had strictly controlled their issuance according to the quantity of church land available. However, once the printing presses started rolling, the temptation of unlimited money beca too irresistible. Many governnts, especially those living hand-to-mouth, couldn't resist the allure of unrestrained money printing. The exact amount of assignats in circulation was unknown, but rumors suggested it was enough to buy the church land several tis over. This rapid inflation of assignats put imnse pressure on the nation.
If the governnt could seize the land of emigrated nobles and use it as collateral for assignats, the crisis could be temporarily alleviated. Of course, if they kept printing assignats, it would eventually lead to a catastrophe, but who cared about the future?
This proposal easily passed in the Assembly. The Feuillants, of course, opposed it, and Lafayette didn't want to press too hard on the nobility. However, the moderates, along with the Jacobins, had the majority in the Assembly.
Then, as Brissot hoped, the king vetoed the bill. According to the constitution, the king had the power to veto laws passed by the Assembly. The king knew that vetoing such a bill would anger the Assembly, but with the Feuillants now his only reliable allies, he had no other option.
Interestingly, the veto increased Brissot's reputation. If this tactic worked, it could be used again. Brissot quickly introduced a bill to stop paying salaries to priests who refused to pledge allegiance to the Republic. Naturally, the king vetoed this bill as well.
Through a series of maneuvers, Brissot established his reputation in the Assembly. With the support of Danton and others, he united many moderates around him and earned Louis XVI the nickna "Mr. Veto," reinforcing the image of an unyielding monarch.
As for the second aspect of his radical direction, it was war.
With the support of Mr. Danton and his associates, Brissot had to speak for their interests. However, he couldn't express this externally. His slogan for promoting war was "Export the Revolution."
Lafayette had been emphasizing the issues within the French army and its lack of combat readiness, using it as a reason to delay war. anwhile, Robespierre continually attacked the possible "military dictators."
In response to Lafayette, Brissot argued that while the French army had its problems, other countries' armies had even more significant issues. He believed that the French Revolution had inspired all of Europe, with people in most European nations hoping for their own revolutions. They looked to the French revolutionary army with great anticipation. Once war broke out, the French army would be invincible, according to Brissot.
Regarding Robespierre's concerns, Brissot mockingly suggested that he actually believed in the goodwill of foreign feudal monarchs and underestimated the patriotic fervor of the French people.
Under Brissot's leadership, the moderate factions quickly gathered strength. A significant number of individuals, including Varennes and the Roland couple, rallied around Brissot. Once they united, war was just one step away.
On November 29th, the Assembly passed a resolution, demanding that the king imdiately warn the Elector of Trier to disband the armies of French emigrant nobles in his territory. If he refused, France would use any ans necessary, including force, to protect its security.
This ti, "Mr. Veto" didn't veto the resolution. Instead, he approved it and sent the warning to the Elector of Trier.
The Elector of Trier was a mber of the so-called "Holy Roman Empire." In theory, threatening to use force against him ant threatening to use force against Austria. Louis XVI and Queen Marie Antoinette had previously hoped for the Emperor to invade France, but he had fled after so bluster and had never ntioned an invasion again. Thus, the Assembly's resolution was a pleasant surprise for the king and queen.
However, things took a turn that no one expected.
The feudal monarchs across the Rhine were terrified by France's warning. They were as afraid of the chaos within France as the French were of their internal divisions, and they were apprehensive of the French revolutionary ideas spreading to their own territories.
Moreover, it wasn't entirely baseless. In so of these countries, people had shalessly violated France's intellectual property rights by forming their own "Friends of the Constitution" clubs. While it was unclear how many royalists there were in France (despite emigres' claims about the prevalence of royalist sentint), there was no doubt that these neighboring states had their own royalist sympathizers.
Consequently, the Electors imdiately backpedaled. They sent envoys to Vienna to ask for the Emperor's protection and dispatched representatives to France to clarify the misunderstanding.
In reality, if the Holy Roman Emperor had displayed so backbone and led the charge against France, they might have been able to intimidate the revolutionaries. However, the Emperor was constrained by the Eastern Roman Empress, who, although the most fervently anti-French ruler in the world, had assud the role of protecting France in this particular instance.
Interestingly, it was the King of Spain who issued so words of warning. After all, he was a Bourbon, too. Yet, his protest was feeble, rely requesting that France respect other nations' sovereignty and avoid threatening them with force. This appeal did little more than display his own timidity.
The "Roman Emperor" had to urgently consult with the King of Prussia to devise a plan. They also dispatched envoys to England to seek assistance. However, England made it clear that it understood and respected the Emperor's position in this matter. It was willing to remain neutrally benevolent.
This was a reasonable stance for England. If it had joined the chorus against France, it might have indeed deterred the French from acting rashly. After all, the English were staunchly anti-Catholic. However, the English knew that the Holy Roman Emperor didn't want war with France. With this assurance, the French were emboldened, and war was now on the horizon.
In Europe, the French loved food and beautiful won, the Italians cherished art and beautiful won, but the English? The English had no other interests except witnessing the conflagration on the European continent.
Until the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia ca to an agreent, Austria had to maintain restraint, which further encouraged France's bellicose elents.
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