Affected by this, even the "Yun-7" project was shelved.
Fortunately, the "Xun-4", which started ahead and was the most valued in the early stages, progressed rapidly. It completed acceptance test flights before the "Yun-7" project was terminated and received orders from the Imperial Navy, successfully joining the combat sequence of the Navy Air Force.
In the third round of naval reforms planned by Zhou Yongtao, the "Xun-4" is the most important shipborne aircraft.
The reason is simple, this anti-submarine patrol aircraft is key to removing the "attack" title from the carrier.
In the carrier strike group, attack carriers do not take on anti-submarine missions, accurately speaking, fleet anti-submarine missions. Therefore, in the shipborne air force wing carried by attack carriers, there are usually no anti-submarine patrol aircraft, at most, equipped with several anti-submarine helicopters. The fleet anti-submarine missions are undertaken by the anti-submarine carriers.
This arrangent is mainly because the anti-submarine patrol aircraft are not advanced enough.
Before the "Xun-4", the "Xun-2", using the "Yun-6" twin-engine piston propeller ship-borne transport aircraft as a platform, its performance was not at all advanced.
Although later improved, especially with the replacent of the turboprop engines, the performance of the "Xun-2" improved but still could not cope with the enhanced threat, and the anti-submarine combat efficiency could not et the navy’s requirents, making it impossible to reduce the size of the anti-submarine patrol aircraft squadron.
Therefore, anti-submarine carriers had to carry anti-submarine patrol aircraft.
After the ergence of the "Xun-4", this situation fundantally changed.
With faster flight speed granted by jet engines and greater takeoff weight, the "Xun-4" in performing typical fleet outer anti-submarine missions is ten tis more efficient than the "Xun-2D". Theoretically, the task that previously needed one squadron of 30 "Xun-2D" to complete, now only requires one squadron, at most 8 "Xun-4A" to complete. Because having a large carrier equipped with 8 anti-submarine patrol aircraft occupies not much more area than equipping them with 8 anti-submarine helicopters, it does not significantly impact the strike capability of the shipborne air force wing. Therefore, after the official service entry of "Xun-4A", the Imperial Navy no longer needs dedicated anti-submarine carriers.
Obviously, this is the fundantal condition for the "attack carrier" to be replaced by the "Super Carrier".
Thus, converting a carrier strike group back to a carrier battle group is a matter of course.
However, this is not the crucial point.
The core value of a carrier battle group actually lies in its comprehensive combat capability, which also includes the attack capability emphasized by the carrier strike group.
Fundantally, the primary value of a carrier has always been its unparalleled attack capability.
The attack power of a carrier cos from the ship-borne air force, particularly the advanced performance ship-borne attack aircraft.
No matter the era, no matter how advanced the shipborne fighters are touted, on the flight deck of the Empire’s carriers, the protagonist has always been the attack aircraft. In the era of "War-6", the Imperial Navy even gave up specialized air defense fighters, with all the shipborne combat aircraft capable of executing attack missions.
This is why Zhou Yongtao actively promoted the "Attack-X" project.
To allow the navy to lead the developnt of the next-generation attack aircraft, Zhou Yongtao even gave up participation rights in the "Future Advanced Fighter", that is, the "War-X" project. He agreed to let the air force lead and et the tactical needs of the air force first, developing the navy version based on the air force type.
Actually, this is quite understandable.
For the navy shipborne air force, the shipborne fighter is essentially an interceptor. The primary mission is to sprint hundreds of kiloters away at high speed, using long-range missiles to shoot down bombers carrying heavy anti-ship missiles, not to contest air superiority with enemy fighters.
If engaging the enemy fleet, the emphasis should be on offense.
As for dealing with enemy attack aircraft, it’s even easier.
Shipborne fighters operate around the carrier battle group, backed by shipborne early warning aircraft and anti-air warships on the surface. Dealing with attack aircraft carrying lightweight anti-ship missiles is absolutely effortless. Relying on a complete fleet air defense system, there’s no need for shipborne fighters to intercept attack aircraft.
This intercept feature is vividly reflected in the "War-9".
If used as an interceptor, the "War-9" could still serve for another 20 years without issue.
In other words, if problems arise with the next-generation shipborne fighter developed from the air force’s "War-X", the navy can also improve the "War-9", for instance, by replacing it with a more advanced AESA fire control radar to extend its service ti, allowing for a leisurely developnt of new shipborne fighters.
Actually, this in itself is the plan Zhou Yongtao devised for the Navy Air Force.
Use the air force’s "War-X" if possible; if not, start fresh.
Additionally, the "Zhi-11" project has been abandoned.
Strictly speaking, abandoning the "Zhi-11" is also a compromise, or rather, starting the "Zhi-11" project was in preparation for future compromises.
Unlike ship-borne anti-submarine patrol aircraft, shipborne early warning aircraft do not have high-speed requirents.
Regarding "Yun-6C" itself, because it was replaced with a turboprop engine, serving as a platform for shipborne early warning aircraft is definitely more than adequate.
Therefore, in the navy’s planning, what is needed is not the "Zhi-11", but the "Zhi-6D" with an AESA radar.
It is evident that among the next-generation shipborne aircraft of the navy shipborne air force, the "Attack-X" to replace the "Attack-5" has the highest priority.
Unfortunately, the developnt of the "Attack-X" has not been smooth sailing.
Tracing back, over 20 years ago, the Imperial Navy, following the trend of the tis, proposed the developnt of a heavy attack aircraft capable of sprinting at twice the speed of sound, with a maximum takeoff weight below 40 tons, an operational radius exceeding 1500 kiloters, and a payload of at least 10 tons.
If developed successfully, it would replace the "Attack-5".
These technical performance indicators are very advanced, even now.
As a result, after completing the feasibility study, the Imperial Navy had to acknowledge reality and sought cooperation with the air force, which had similar needs. At that ti, the air force was also developing a supersonic heavy attack aircraft to replace nurous tactical bombers purchased after the great war.
At that ti, the Imperial Navy favored the air force’s latest "Attack-8".
According to the navy’s plan, a heavy attack aircraft suitable for the navy could be developed based on the "Attack-8" by appropriately reducing performance indicators.
It must be said, the Imperial Navy was overly optimistic.
When the "Attack-8" was finalized, its maximum takeoff weight exceeded 50 tons, and the naval shipborne version requires increased structural strength and anti-corrosion treatnt, adding about 2 tons in empty weight. Thus, even a version with reduced performance indicators could not keep the maximum takeoff weight under 45 tons.
Evidently, with the technology at the ti, a low-spec shipborne attack aircraft developed from the "Attack-8" would still weigh at least 45 tons.
Clearly, this weight made it impossible to operate within 40 tons.
Along with other reasons, such as the need to share the developnt cost of the "Attack-8", the navy eventually backed down.
The result was that the Imperial Navy had to undergo multiple modernization improvents for the "Attack-5" to extend its service life.
In fact, even with Zhou Yongtao presiding over the navy’s weapon developnt work, the "Attack-5" served for an excessively long ti.
Although the Navy Air Force had many fanciful ideas, after abandoning the improved version of the "Attack-8", there were no better options.
The only way to improve the attacking capability of the shipborne air force was to enhance the existing "Attack-5", which, indeed, was an excellent shipborne attack aircraft, with its service life exceeding 30 years as the best proof.
Most shipborne aircraft from that era, and even tactical aircraft, had a service life of over 20 years!
However, the flaws of "Attack-5" are also very evident.
The most prominent being its slow flight speed!
For this reason, Zhou Yongtao insisted on pursuing supersonic cruise capability during the "Attack-X" project’s developnt.
At the establishnt of the project, "typical combat load reaching Mach 1.4 at an altitude of 12,000 ters" was set as the priority criterion.
This indicator effectively locked in the other performance characteristics of the "Attack-X".
The result was that the "Attack-X" project ended up wasting a lot of ti.
The key issue was that the service ti of the "Attack-5" was too long.
Although the Imperial Navy Air Force had many fanciful ideas after giving up the improvent of the "Attack-5", there was no better option.
Thus, the only way to improve the strike capability of the shipborne air force was to rely on modernizing the "Attack-5" to extend its service life.
In fact, even when Zhou Yongtao took charge of the navy’s equipnt construction work, "Attack-5" has served the longest.
While "Attack-5" had its shortcomings, the most obvious was its slow flight speed
Transcript continues...but was unrivaled in being an excellent shipborne attack aircraft, with over 30 years of service life.
Most shipborne aircraft, even tactical planes of that era, don’t have a service life of over 20 years!
Hence, "Attack-5"’s drawbacks were quite glaring.
In particular, its flight speed was too slow!
Because of this, Zhou Yongtao had persisted in demanding supersonic cruise capability for the "Attack-X".
When the project was established, achieving a "typical combat load cruising flight speed of Mach 1.4 at an altitude of 12,000 ters" was prioritized.
This specification essentially restricted the other performances of the "Attack-X".
The result was that the "Attack-X" project wasted a lot of ti in vain.
Finally, over 20 years ago, after another promising advanced attack aircraft showcased exceptional performance in battle, the Imperial Navy was suddenly awakened.
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