Baghdad President Mansion.
When Air Force Commander Admiral Hariri introduced the combat situation, Hussein’s frustrated expression looked like he hadn’t relieved himself in over half a month.
As a dictator who relied on a military coup to gain power, Hussein was well aware of how perilous the current situation was.
Although Hariri tried his best to use more positive terms to describe the combat situation, there was no denying the fact that the Iraqi Air Force had lost the morning’s battle. Two of the most advanced MG-29 fighters had been shot down over Kuwaiti airspace near the Saudi border.
Furthermore, the Liangxia Air Force had suffered no losses.
As for the combat reports released by the Air Force headquarter, they were for propaganda purposes.
The battle had just started. It was too early to declare winners or losers, and even if defeated, it was imperative to portray oneself as the victor!
But the question remained: if even the MG-29 could not gain victory in aerial combat, could control of the skies still be maintained?
Though it had been several years, Hussein still vividly rembered when the Luosha Democratic Republic and the Tiaoman Empire’s sales personnel pitched the MG-29 to the Iraqi Air Force, repeatedly emphasizing that it was a third-generation fighter, invincible in the air.
From the flight demonstrations at that ti, the MG-29 indeed appeared to be a very advanced fighter.
That’s why Hussein agreed to purchase 40 units at a price of 60 million Gold Marks each from a military enterprise in the West Continent.
Hariri spent a long ti explaining the details of the combat process.
Hussein wasn’t very clear about the tactical details, nor did he need to be.
The Joint Forces Commander had already announced the establishnt of no-fly zones extending 50 kiloters on either side of the Saudi and Kuwaiti borders.
Any aircraft entering these zones without permission would be shot down!
The Liangxia Empire had formally declared that they would take necessary actions, including military operations, to help restore Kuwait’s sovereignty.
Nearly 100 Liangxia combat aircraft were deployed in Saudi Arabia, approximately 50 of which were fighters, and they also had two Armored Battalions on the ground.
Could this war be fought?
That morning, Hussein had discussed this issue for several hours with Foreign Minister Hassan, and their conclusion was that they could still avoid conflict with the Liangxia Empire as long as they withdrew their troops in ti. By completely abandoning the idea of annexing Kuwait, they could still maintain sovereignty and political independence.
Hassan specifically ntioned that the Liangxia Empire wouldn’t be able to amass sufficient forces for an attack within just a few days.
These days were a window for a ceasefire.
In other words, as long as concessions were made before the Liangxia Empire completed its comprehensive war preparations, war escalation could be avoided.
According to Hassan, there were still at least seven days left.
This assessnt was later confird.
At the outset, Senior General Shi Shouliang of the Joint Forces announced to the press that the first phase of operation "Copper Wall Iron Curtain," focusing on defense, would continue until August 10—about seven days—and would be extended or shortened based on actual combat conditions.
It was expected that from August 11 onward, the Joint Forces would shift from defense to offense.
This was not rely a slogan but a real threat!
In the recently concluded eting, including Hariri, most high-ranking generals acknowledged that seven days was enough ti for the Liangxia forces to complete necessary military deploynts.
Perhaps they couldn’t deploy enough ground troops, but they could undoubtedly station a substantial number of air forces.
Next would co the air strikes.
Indeed, this was already expected.
The several weapons simulations conducted last month had repeatedly emphasized that the Liangxia Empire would likely focus on airstrikes in the early stages of the war.
After conducting long, intense bombings that would essentially cripple Iraq’s defense capabilities, they would allow the ground troops to launch an offensive.
In fact, this was not the view of the Iraqi military but the conclusion given by the Tiaoman advisors.
In other words, if the Tiaoman forces were to fight this war, they too would begin with bombings in the initial phase, ensuring sufficient confidence before launching a ground war.
As a result, the pressure was now on the Air Force.
Who would have thought that in the first two encounters, the Air Force would be soundly defeated?
If the battle three days ago could be considered an accident—after all, "Super Flag" wasn’t a fighter jet but an attack aircraft with less remarkable maneuverability—
Then the morning’s battle was unexplainable.
Two well-prepared MG-29s had been shot down while on the offensive, and crucially, they had no opportunity to fire back even once before being downed.
According to Hariri, it was an ambush.
This was clearly an attempt to shift the bla!
The Air Force was already on combat readiness, and the several radars deployed in the southern region were operational; why didn’t they detect the approaching Liangxia fighters in ti?
In the past, Hussein would have had Hariri imprisoned by the guards by now.
But now, that was definitely not an option.
After the situation had been fully described, Hariri specifically ntioned that the early deploynt of the Liangxia Air Force was far from sufficient, and therefore, enough troops could be invested to take control of the airspace.
But the question was, what good would controlling the airspace do?
Was it just to defend the borders, or to declare, through action, that the no-fly zone announced by the Joint Forces Commander was effectively nonexistent?
Clearly, such an action would be aningless.
To make control of the airspace worthwhile, ground troops needed to continue advancing south, attacking Saudi Arabia, and at the very least capturing the northern parts of Saudi Arabia.
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